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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS lHAXYVELL, \ 
Petitioner-Appellant, I 
vs. Case No. 
10924 
JOIIN ,V. TUUNER, \Varden, ) 
Utah .State Prison, 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEl\1ENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Dennis Maxwell, appeals from the 
denial of the relief prayed for in his petition for a 'Vrit 
of Habeas Corpus. 
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT 
The appellant filed his petition for a 'Vrit of 
Habeas Corpus in the District Court of the Second 
I 
Judicial District, in and for 'y eber County. A hearing 
was held on April 24th, 1967, before the Honorable 
Charles G. Cowley, judge presiding. Appellant was 
present in person and by his counsel, Paul D. Vernieu. 
Testimony was taken. At the conclusion of the hearing, 
the court having found no evidence of any impropriety 
resulting in appellant's entering a plea of guilty to the 
charge, entered an order denying the relief prayed 
for in the Petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits the decision of the trial court 
should be affirmed. 
STATE1\1ENT OF FACTS 
On or about January 10th, 1962, appellant was the 
subject of a burglary investigation by Weber County 
Sheriff, Leroy Hadley (Tr. 5) . The initial in terroga-
tion in this matter took place at appellant's home (Tr. 
5, 49) . After talking to him in his home, the sheriff 
decided to take appellant into custody (Tr. 10). Ap-
pellant was then taken to the jail in Ogden, along 
with a hi-fi set that was part of the property involved 
in the burglary under investigation. He appeared the 
following morning in the city court and was charged 
with second degree burglary (Tr. 7, 52). At his ap-
pearance in the city court, appellant requested time to 
retain counsel and the case was set over so that he might 
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Jo so (Tr. 7). Immediately following his appearance 
iu the city court, appellant posted his bail and then went 
to the sheriff's office for further investigation (Tr. 
8, 52). The appellant's appearance in the city court 
awl his subsequent meeting- with Sheriff Hadley oc-
curred on the same day, on or about January 11th, 
1962. 
Appellant's next court appearance was in the 
District Court for the Second Judicial District on 
February 5, 1962 (Tr. 24). He had not retained 
eounsel in the interim, apparently having decided to 
plead guilty. On that date, appeilant was advised of 
his right to counsel. He was examined thoroughly by 
the court as to whether or not he wanted counsel (Tr. 
:25). He then knowingly and intelligently waived his 
right to counsel (Tr. 25). The court then informed 
him that it would not be necessary for him to enter a 
plea at that time. However, appellant preferred to 
waiYe the waiting period and entered a plea of guilty 
to the charge of second degree burglary (Tr. 26, 27). 
Sentencing was postponed pending investigation by 
the Utah State Board of Adult Probation and Parole 
(Tr. 28). 
The defendant appeared in the district court for 
sentencing on February 19th, 1962, at which time he 
was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for the period 
provided by law. Other pertinent facts will be men-
tioned in the argument portion of this brief. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RECORD REVEALS XO EYIDEXCE 
THAT APPELLANT'S "TAIYER OF COGN-
SEL AND ENTRY OF A PLEA OF GCILTY 
WAS THE RESULT OF I)IPROEER COER-
CION, l\IISREPRESENTATIOX, OR IXDCCE-
MENT ON TH~ PART OF LA"T EXFORCE-
l\1ENT OFFICIALS. 
Both of appellant's arguments, viz., that he was 
denied the right to counsel, and that he was improperly 
induced to enter a plea of guilty, are predicated 011 
his allegations that statements made by John Holmes, 
a probation officer, and Sheriff Hadley, caused appel-
lant to believe he would get probation in return for 
his plea of guilty. Thus, his two arguments resoln into 
a question of whether or not such inducement did, in 
fact, occur. 
Respondent submits that John Holmes, the pro-
bation officer, could have had nothing to do with induc-
ing appellant to plead guilty. It is conclusively estab-
lished in the record that appellant entered his plea of 
guilty on February 5th, 1962 (Tr. 24). Reason tells 
us that any inducement would have to occur prior to the 
time of the entry of a plea. Yet, appellant admits on 
cross-examination that he did not talk to John Holmes 
prior to February 5th. 
Q. (By l\Ir. X ewey) So John Holmes certainly 
couldn't have induced you to plead guilty when 
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you didn't talk to him about the case until after 
you had entere<l your plea on February 5th; 
isn't that true? 
A. Yes, sir. (Tr. 31) 
* * * 
Q. After February 5th that you talked to Mr. 
Ilolmes. So that anything ~Ir. Holmes said 
couldn't liave induced you to plead guilty; isn't 
that true? 
A. Uh, huh. (Tr. 34) 
Respondent submits that for this reason the alle-
gation that appellant was induced to plead guilty by 
John Holmes has no basis in fact and is therefore 
\rithout merit. In view of this admission, this court 
need not consider the possibility of inducement by 
,)fr. Holmes. 
There remains then, only the possibility that Sheriff 
Leroy Hadley could have influenced appellant to enter 
his plea of guilty. Respondent submits that if, in fact, 
appellant was wrongly induced to enter his plea of 
guilty, a release on habeas corpus would be appro-
priate. Behrens v. Hironimus, 166 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 
mets); Piner v. United States, 222 F.2d 199 (7th Cir. 
19.35). However, the burden of proving the induce-
ment rests on the petitioner for habeas corpus. Behrens 
t'. Hirunimus, 170 F.2d 627 (4th Cir. 1948); Gensbur,q 
r. Smith, 35 'Vash. 2d 849, 215 P.2d 880 (1950), cert. 
den. :~40 U.S. 83.5 (1950). If the petitioner in a habeas 
eorpus petition urging wrongful inducement of his plea 
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fails to prove that allegation, the writ will not he 
granted. 
There is a presumption that the proceedings as 
shown by the record at the time of conviction were 
regular. United States ex rel Giesel v. Claudy, 96 F. 
Supp. 201 CYV.D. Pa. 1951) ; Hall v. Edmondson, 
177 Kan. 404, 279 P .2d 290 ( 1955). In order to war-
rant his release on th~ habeas corpus, petitioner must 
put in sufficient evidence to overcome this presumption. 
Nunn v. Humphrey, 79 F. Sup. 8 (M.D. Pa. 1948); 
fVhite v. Hudspeth, 166 Kan. 63, 199 P.2d 518 (1948). 
"Tith these rules in mind, respondent submits that ap-
pellant has failed in his proof of his allegations of 
inducement. It is well settled that the unsupported and 
uncorroborated statements of a petitioner in habeas 
corpus will not suffice to carry his evidentiary burden. 
Kanive v. Hudspeth, 165 Kan. 658, 198 P.2d 162 
( 1948). Nowhere in the record is there any testimony 
to support petitioner's allegations of inducement. On 
the contrary, said allegations are refuted in whole by 
hoth John Holmes and Sheriff Hadley. Both the pro-
bation officer and Sheriff Hadley flatly denied having 
ever made promises of probation to the appellant in 
return for a plea of guilty from him (Tr. 46, 61). 
If we assume, however, for the purposes of this 
argument that Sheriff Hadley did in fact promise the 
defendant that he would get probation in exchange 
for his plea of guilty. in light of the record here. re-
spollllent submits that this would not have influenced 
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;1 ppellaut to enter a plea of guilty. There can be no 
,., rongful inducement when the person claiming to have 
!wen induced knows as a fact at the time that the person 
making a promise has no authority whatsoever to make 
:-.uch a promise. Ex parte Hall, 91 Okla. Crim. 11, 
n:.i P.~d 587 (1950); State v. Terry, 30 N.J. Super. 
:Z~8, 104< A.2d 332 ( 1954); Commonwealth ex rel Camp-
bell v. Ashe, 141 Pa. Super. 408, 15 A.2d 409 (1940). 
I 11 this ease, appelJant admits in his testimony at the 
hearing that he had knowledge of the fact that the 
Sl1criff had no authority to make promises, nor could 
he enforce any promises as to whether or not appellant 
would receive probation. 
Q. (By l\'lr. Newey) Have you been on proba-
tion before? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. "Then you were put on probation before, 
were you put on probation by the Sheriff? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. 'Vere you put on probation by the probation 
department? 
A. No, sir. 
(~. 'Vho put you on probation when you went 
on before? 
A. A judge. 
Q. Now did you understand Mr. Hadley to say, 
as you say: "Ile promised me definitely that I 
would get probation?" You knew Mr. Hndley 
didn't giYe prohntion; didn't you? 
.r\. This is true. (Tr. 35) 
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Thus, it is clearly apparent that even had Sheriff 
Hadley made the statements alleged to have been made 
by him, appellant was not influenced or induced in any 
way, for the reason that he knew that whatever promises 
the sheriff might make could not be made authorita-
tively. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that the record on appeal 
dearly and adequately refutes all of petitioner's allega-
tions. It could hardly be argued that any statements 
b)· John llolmes made after entry of plea had an 
effect on appellant's plea. That he could not have been 
influenced by John Holmes is all too obvious. With 
respect to Sheriff Hadley, it is likewise apparent that 
whatever he may have said had no effect on appellant 
since he knew that the sheriff had no authority to make 
any promises to him. Appellant has based his claim 
of coercion on statements made by the probation officer 
aud the sheriff at the time of his arrest and conviction. 
'Vhen, by his own testimony, appellant clearly and 
convincingly disproves his allegations, respondent sub-
mi ls that the only course for this court to follow is to 
affirm the decision of the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
J. FRANKLIN ALLRED 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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